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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HOWELL UJIFUSA,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

NATIONAL HOUSEWARES, INC.,
Defendant and
Appellant.

Case
No.
11901

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals from judgment in plaintiff's
favor of $10,194.63 damages for the compression fracof the second lumbar vertebra sustained while
he was a passenger on a snowmobile being operated
in defendant's business.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOvVER COURT
Plaintiff's case was tried to a jury, issues were
submitted on instructions by the court, and the judgment of $10,194.63 was rendered by the jury.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a determination as a matter of
law that plaintiff is not entitled to recover the judgment or that the amount of the judgment is excessive
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff cannot agree that the Statement of Facts
as contained in defendant's Brief is fair.
Plaintiff, it was undisputed, was a business guest
of the defendant and was at Alta for the purpose of
taking pictures of their snowmobile, using a camera
which was in their line of products. See Exhibit P-12
for an illustration of some of the pictures taken
plaintiff.
The snowmobile was being driven by David Bigler, a Vice-President of defendant. CR. 166). He was
familiar with the area over which the snowmobile
was to be driven and had_ been to the area the prior
week. He observed that there was a hump of snu\,blocking the service road created by snov,- that had
been pushed in from the road belovv. CR. 167)
He observed that the hump was there and that he
had to go around the edge of it in order to go up
beyond the automobile traveled portion of the road.
CR. 167-168) Plaintiff rode on the sno\Nmobile sitting
on the seat behind the driver and had no control over
the way the vehicle was operated and_ could not see
exactly where it was being driven. Mr. Bigler in2

to drive the snowmobile off the jump when
iw came back with the plaintiff riding on it., and
::1c •.tally drove it off the top of the hump at 15 to 20
1niks an hour. He estimated that the snowmobile
jumped 12 to 15 inches. (R. 168) Mr. Woodruff, a
1Yitness vvho was below vvatching the snowmobile
come down over the hump, estimated that it jumped
l 0 to 12 feet across through the air. ( R. 159) Bigler
came down over the jump a second time and negotintecl it without the snowmobile leaving the ground,
and this time he estimates that his speed when going
over the hump was approximately 5 miles an hour.
1R. 169 l He also stated that it was not necessary to
go over the hump at all, that he could have sneaked
around the side. rn. 169) The snowmobile has no
absorbers. The driver stands up, holding the
steering handles so that he can absorb the shock of
driving over rough terrain. lR. 170). He testified
that he did not intend to jump the snowmobile,
1R. 172), and in his opinion, it jumped only 3 to 4
feet. Following the jump, Bigler landed on top of
plaintiff, lighting on his stomach area, and the back
of the machine caught the plaintiff in the middle of
the hack and his head was throvvn back ( R. 17 3).
Following the injury to Mr. Ujifusa, Bigler tested the
machine over the hump, and with the speed of the
machine wide open, at approximately 35 miles an
hour. it jumped off the hump a distance of 12 feet
(R. 173).
\f'11dl"d
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Bigler did not intend to jump the snowmobilP
since he had two people on it, and the individual in
back doesn't have much balance and can be thro\1 11
anyvYhere if you intentionally jump the machine fast
with two people on it. Bigler did not advise plailltiff
that he intended to jump the machine nor tell him
to take any extra precautions CR. 173-17+>.
Plaintiff suffered immediate pain and injury following the jump as described by witness Bigler, am!
slid off the snowmobile into the snow and laid there.
\Vitness Woodruff thought he had the ,,·ind knocked
out of his lungs temporarily. After he had laid then•
for 60 seconds or so, they wondered why he didn't
get up, and this went on for four or five minutes.
They finally removed him from the scene, and he
laid in the car for 15 to 20 minutes. ( R. 60 ! Plaintiff
was able to take the pictures required after the 20
minute interval, and after he returned home 011 thl'
evening of December 20th, consulted Dr. Robe1·t II.
Lamb. Dr. Lamb x-rayed plaintiff and diagnosed hi'
injuries as a compression facture of the second lumbar vertebra. <R. 104> A compression fracturt>
caused, on occasion, by a person being doubled oYer
and having a weight fall on him, ( R. 107l, or from
falling from a height and landing 011 his feet. Tl1e
X-rays, Dr. Lamb testified, indicated that there
some change in the intervertebrnl disc itself as show11
by the rough edges betvveen the vPrtebnH'. CR. 110
Dr. Lamb recomrnl'nded that IVIr. lljifusa go into tlw
1

Jvi,pital because of the pain, where he could be made
:nnre comfortable sooner if he stayed off his feet.
: 'n\\·ever, plaintiff's business demands were such that
lw could not go to the hospital, and so the doctor put
him in a three point brace, giving pressure in the
upper chest and on the surfaces of the bone below
an<l at the micldle of the back, extending the back
as much as possible. (R. 113-114). Plaintiff wore the
brace for 70 days, to March 1st (R. 114). Dr. Lamb
examined plaintiff on the 17th day of April, 1969
and '"'as of the opinion that he would continue to
c.uffer discomfort in the back, soreness. in his back,
especially on quick motions or twisted motions, more
than on flexion or extension of the spine, and on that
day no essential change in the configuration of the
second lumbar vertebra had occurred except that the
healing process had taken place (R. 115). Dr. Lamb
was of the opinion that degenerative changes in the
area would take place and that it was just a matter
of how much pain plaintiff was willing to toleratewhen the pain became intolerable to him, a fusion
could be carried out at that time (R. 116). Dr.
Lamb rated the plaintiff as having a 10% permanent
partial disability of the spine, the disability being in
the nature of soreness, discomfort, especially on
motions of twisting of the spine CR. 117).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT CORRECTLY
TH1\ 1
ASSUMPTION OF RISK SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, BUT DID SUBMIT THE
QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
This court, in two very recent decisions, has carefully set forth the principles which govern the submission to a jury of the question of assumption of
risk, and has also differentiated between assumpti.on
of risk and contributory negligence. In Johnson r.
i11aynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884, the court
cussed assumption of risk at considerable length.
pointing out that this doctrine developed originally·
in the cases where it was necessary to protect employers, and was designed to insulate the employers
as much as possible from bearing the cost of huma11
overhead (Utah, P. 272). The court then established
the principle Applicable in the following language.
"The fundAmental conside1·ation underlying it
is that one should not be permitted to knowingly and voluntarily incur an obvious risk of
personAl harm when he has the ability to
avoid doing so, and then hold another responsible for his injury. Its essential elements
are: knowledge of a danger and a free and
voluntary consent to assurne it."
In the case at bar, there is a complete lacking of
the essential elements stated in Johnson l'. l\Iaynard
6

-upra). There was no showing that the plaintiff had
h1owledge that the defendant intended to drive the
'-llOvYmobile over the hump and make it jump, and
11ot having such kno\veldge, there was no free
and voluntary consent. vVitness Bigler testified
that it was not necessary to go over the hump,
that he could go around it, it was not necessary to
go over it at the speed with which he went over it,
and that he could negotiate it at five miles an hour
\Yithout it jumping at all. He specifically testified
that he did not warn plaintiff that he intended to go
over the jump nor advise him as to precautions he
take to safeguard himself from injury.
1

This is a case of the operator of the snowmobile
unnecessarily going over the hump, going over it at
a high rate of speed in excess of the speed with which
it could be reasonably and safely negotiated. These
acts of negligence, defendant could not anticipate, let
alone know were about to occur.
The court submitted the plaintiff's case to the
jur)', advising them that if the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, he could not recover.
The court, in Instruction No. 9, submitted defend;:infs negligence in permitting the snowmobile to go
o\'er the drop or jump, and stated that defendant
ronld not recover if he himself was negligent CR. 55).
Again, in Instruction No. 10, the court submitted the
nPgligence of ddemlant in failing to keep a lookout
7

for conditions of the surface over which the sno\\mobile was operated, and again advised the jury that
if plaintiff himself was negligent, he could rn:t
recover CR. 56). In Instruction No. 11, the court submitted the defendant's negligence in operating at a
speed which was unsafe, and advised the jury for
the third time that the plaintiff could not recover if
he were contributorily negligent CR. 5 7).
In Instruction No. 12, the court added a fourth
instruction to the jury that the passenger must exercise reasonable care for his own safety, and that if
he failed to exercise such care, he could not recover
from the operator. The language of Instruction No.
12 is particularly applicable and is as follows:
"So long as a passenger does exercise ordinary
care for his own safety, and in the absence of
appearances that caution him or would caution a reasonably prudent person in like position, he has a right to assume that the operator of the vehicle in which he is a passeng('r
will perform all the duties required of such
operator an cl vvill exercise reasona hle care
and caution to provide him with a safe trip."
CR. 58)

It is the position of plaintiff that this language
submitted to the jury a carefully and fairly vvorcl('d
instruction presenting the issues on vvhich they v\·err
to deliberate, and that clefendant could not, under
any circumstances, have been prejudiced by the
court's instrnctions.
8

The court also instructed the jury on unavoidable
or inevitable accidents in Instruction No. 13, ancl
;,(lvised them that if the acddent was an unavoidable
oi' inevitable accident, their verdict should be for
defendant (R. )9 ! .
It is plaintiff's position that the kind of negligence
\Yhich caused him to be injured could not have been
011ticipated and was not inherent in a ride up ·CH'
down the hill in a snowmobile. The injury resulted
from the operator's failure to keep the vehicle operati11g at a speed which was reasonable considering the
contour over which he intentionally drove the vehicle
;rnd which he admitted could be safely traversed. He
could have directed it so as to avoid even the necessity
of going over the hump or jump.
This court, in the recent case of Ei ans v. Stuart,
17 Utah 2d 308, +10 P.2d 999, stated that assumption
of risk, while closely related to contributory negligence, is not identical with it, and again recited the
mle set forth in ,Waynard v. Johnson, supra, that the
risk to be assumed must be one \Yhich is of a known
danger and there must be a reasonable opportunity
to make an alternative choice (Utah, P. 312). The
danger causing injury to plaintiff was not known,
;md there obviously wss no alternative choice since
he had no knowledge of the danger.
1

The most recent case discussing the doctrine of
assumption of risk is Hindmarsh Z'. 0. P. Skagr;s Food9

liner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410. The court there
made the following statement concerning the doctrine .of assumption of risk:
"The doctrine of assumption of risk is but a
specialized aspect of the defense of contributory negligence. This court has repeatedly
declared the law in that respect: that it
applies only where the plaintiff knew of and
appreciated a danger, and had a reasonable
opp.ortunity to make an alternative choice,
but nevertheless voluntarily exposed himself
to the danger in question. It is not shown
here that the plaintiff had any such knowledge, nor a reasonable opportunity to make
an alternative choice. Therefore, that doctrine does not entitle the defendant to the
relief it seeks here."
It is respectfully submitted that the la\Y as set
forth in the cases quoted, clearly illustrate that the
doctrine of assumption of risk was not applicable to
the facts as shown by the evidence, and the court correctly submitted the case to the jury on the doctri11<'
of negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligenc<'.
The court's instructions fully and carefully submittC'd
t.o the jury for its determination the issues presented
by the evidence, and the ver<lict should be upheld.
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POL'\'T II
Tl lE DAIVIAGES A \YARDED BY THE .JURY
\\'ERE MODEST IN AMOCNT, CONSIDERING
Tl IE PERlVIANENT INJURY SUFFERED BY
PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff suffr.red a compression fracture of th<'
lumhar v<'rtPbra, \vhich is a permanent injury.
a11d as has hecn clearly outlined in the statement of
forts, with referPnc<' to Dr. Lamb's testimony, a comprPssion fracture never heals. The vertebra itself
rPmains in a compr<'ssed state for the balance of an
injured 1wrson's life. and no surgical intervention to
the fracture is justified.
This kind of injury, giving a permanent disability
of 1O"u, estimated
Dr. Lamb, means that Mr.
t:jifusa will suffer the balance of his life.
1rns that he was born 011 :\fay 26. 192 5, and at the
time of trial would have been t-t- years old (R. 128).
Plaintiff's business as a commercial photographer
n•quired him to engage in a great d('al of physical
activity, and for t\vo months following his injury he
was not able to do the ordinary work that the job
n'quired. He had to hire a helper to take his heavy
canwras and other equipment around with him
1 R. 1 H). He testified that the back is painful, is constant. and is comparable to a constant toothache

<R. 1·+5l.
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Plaintiff testified that there were a lot of things
he is not able to do that he did before, and it makes
it necessary to farm out activities such as weddings.
He had about five weddings per month whicl1, tri ! 11t
time of trial, he was still farming out ( R. 1+ti J. HP
testified that anything that requires a heavier
camera, he sends someone else out to do the v\·ork or
has his work done by other photographers ( R. 1+6147). In addition, the injury restricts his recreational
activity. He can still fish and bO\'\·l, but can't play
golf because the pain interferes with his S\Ying ( R.
1+8). Dr. Lamb testified that plaintiff's condition is
permanent and that if pain becomes intolerable, it
would require a fusion operation of the back ( R. 11 () 1.
There was no dispute of Dr. Lamb's testimony, no
medical witness was offered by defendant, and there
was no serious controversion by evidence of the plaintiff's testim.ony concerning his injury. It is respectfully submitted that there is no basis for a claim
that the jury was confused or impassioned or that thP
verdict which tlH y gave was the rC'c.ult of passion or
prejudice.
1

The Trial Court passed on thC' motion for rC'duction and remittitur of the verdict and concluded that
it was not in excess of what was reasonable. It dC'Jli('d
the motion made bv defendant.
This court, in many cases, has examined the ru!P"
and attempted to set forth the principles \\hich \\Ould
govern the considen=ition of V('rdits v"'11erf' thf'r(' wns ;1
12

clilim either .of excPssiv<'ll('Ss or inadequacy. !·mm all
ilw cases, it would sef'rn tlrnt th<' co11clusio11 m<Hi<- by
1""l1«' Crockf'tt i11 thC' case' of Stamp
l'ru/.nod Co111pmn-, ) L'tah 2d )CJ7,

L'.

Union fJacifir
P.2d 2/(), i11

liis
opinion. are correct statenw11ts oi tlw
principle's goYPr11i11g judicial consideration of verdict". lIC' statC'd:
.. The first sw h rul(' is that courts should (•xercise gr('at caution and forlwarancf' in disturbing jury v<'rdicts to the c·1Hl that tlw important
right of trial by jury is preserved. Moreover,
after the lower court has given its approval to
the award bv refusing to set aside or modify
the verdict, that much additional verity is
thereby conferred upon it and the appellate
court, a forti.ori, should lw more reluctant to
i11terfrre \vith the jwy wrdict and the judgment of the court becaus(' of their advantaged
positio11 in having first-hand vie\\· of the proceedings and "ill do so 011lv \\·hen to pennit
it to stand would \\Ol'k a manifest injustice.''
Justice Crockf'tt further differentiates between
t\Yo kinds of Pxcessiveness in a\vards, those so gross!)·
(''(CPssive as to shock the consciPnce and indicate
clPilrl)· that thP verdict resulted from passion, prejudice or corruption, or that the jtir)·
misconcein'd its function. In such cases the verdict is
t;1i11tPd with injusticP and a new trial should be
[!T;111tC'd uncomlitionalh·. It is n·s1wctfull)· submitted
that 110 such claim of grnss excessive11C'ss would stand
a11;dysis in thC' prPsC'nt case. It must then he that the
(lpfr11dant is ch1irning that tlw plaintiffs verdict 1s
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of the class described by Justice Crockett as follows:
" . . . but where there is an award obviously
above any reasonable appraisal of the daniages suffered, which may have resulterl iroin
misconception of evidence, or error in judgment, or undue liberality to the extent that
the court in fairness and justice cannot permit
the award to stand in the amount given."
It is respectfully submitted that after all the
analysis of the prior decisions of the court is completed, the statement found in Duffy v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 118 Utah 82, 218 P.2d 1080, Page 91, is probably accurate.

"Previously decided cases are of little value
fixing present day standards or in assistinp;
courts in determining excessive awards. Both
the court and. jury are required to deal wi 1I1
many unknown factors and a good. guess iabout the best that can be hoped for. ThP
permissible minimum and maximum limits
within vvhich a jury may operate for a give11
injury are presently far apart and must continue to be widespread so long as pain and
suffering must be measured hv money standards."
It is respectfully submitter\ that $10, 1CJ4.63 is not
an excessive amount to be awarded by a jury for a
10% permanent partial d.isa bility consisting of a compression fracture of the second lumbar vertebra.

14

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the jury verdict
, 1ir, the amount not in excess of reasonable, con..,jdering the plaintiff's permanent injury, that defendant had a fair trial and the issues were submitted
\Yith lawful instructions, and that the judgment of
the lower court should be affirmed with costs to the
rlaintiff.
Respectfully submitted this ________________________ clay of
--------------------------------------------, 1970.

DVVIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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